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First Officer, Capital Airlines; Member, Board of Directors, Air
Line Pilots Association, 1952; B.S., University of Maryland, 1947.
M ILEAGE limitation for airline pilots has been involved, during
the past twenty years, in over thirty instances of proposed con-
tracts between pilots and management. On three occasions, it has as-
sumed the proportions of actual disputes which went before special
fact-finding boards for hearings, analysis, and recommendations. On
each occasion the subject was presented in a different manner: (1) a
definite limitation on the miles flown each month, (2) a variable
restriction on hours and a fixed limitation on miles flown each month,
and (3) a definite set mileage limitation for each airplane to be com-
puted as it was placed into service.
To the airline executive mileage limitation generally means just
another method of "featherbedding." To the pilot it is a method of
sharing in the increased productivity as a result of flying the heavier,
faster airplanes and a means by which he can more definitely insure
his continued employment. To various medical groups, it is a matter
to be considered seriously because of the safety aspect.
The need for an official limitation of the flight hours for pilots is
unquestioned. There is disagreement, however, on where this limita-
tion should be set, and as to whether there exists a need for an addi-
tional direct limitation of mileage. As early as 1931, the Secretary of
Commerce, under authority of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, limited
first pilots to 110 hours per month. Effective October 1, 1934, the
maximum flight hours of pilots was limited to 100 per month.'
Back in 1934, it appeared to be generally conceded that the original
monthly maximum of 110 flight hours was too high. The Aero Medical
Association of the United States, composed of flight surgeons and
* Paper read in "Seminar in Air Transportation," University of Maryland,
December, 1952.
1 Hours, Wages and Working Conditions in Scheduled Air Transportation,
Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Washington, D.C., 1936, p. 74.
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doctors who practice aviation medicine, recommended, in 1931, that
the maximum day hours be set at a point somewhere between 90 and
110, and the maximum night hours at a point somewhere between 60
and 75. At its annual meeting in 1933, the same association recom-
mended a maximum of 85 hours per month.2
Until early in the 1930's pilots were paid in proportion to miles
flown, with a base salary to protect them somewhat against the ir-
regularities in operation arising primarily from weather conditions.
A typical formula as established by the Post Office Department in the
early days of air transportation follows:
Pilots received a base salary and in addition, pay for the number
of miles flown. The base salary on routes where daylight flying was
scheduled was $2,000 per annum. On routes where the schedule
called for night flying, not to exceed one-third of the mileage, the
base pay was $2,400 per annum. On routes where the schedule
called for both day and night flying, and night flying exceeded one-
third of the mileage, the base pay was $2,600 per annum, and on
the routes where the schedule called for all night flying, the base
salary was $2,800 per annum.3
The figures shown above were starting salaries, and pilots were
given raises at the rate of $100 per year over a period of eight years.
The highest base pay which could be received was $3,600 per annum.
This base pay figure was not exceeded by the airline pilots until 1951
when certain groups of pilots obtained an increase in their base pay
to $4,200 per annum.
In addition to the base pay, for day flying, the pilots who flew for
the Post Office in the early days of flying were paid 5, 6, or 7 cents a
mile for each mile flown with mail or for miles flown on ferry flights.
The 5 cent rate was paid between Cleveland and Cheyenne. The 6
cent rate was paid between Cheyenne and Reno, Nevada, and the
7 cent rate was paid between New York and Cleveland, and between
Reno and San Francisco. The differences in the rates were in recogni-
tion of the hazards encountered in flying the mountainous terrain. For
night flying, the mileage rate was doubled, and pilots were paid 10, 12,
and 14 cents respectively for the routes outlined above. Under that
formula, were it still in existence today, a pilot flying a DC-6 or Con-
stellation during the night hours between New York and Cleveland
and flying 85 hours a month would receive $2,975 per month in mileage
pay alone, and in addition he would receive approximately $300 per
month base pay. Thus his monthly earnings would be $3,275, or to
express it in another way, his earnings would be $39,300 per year.
Actually under today's contract that pilot is, making less than $1,500
per month or less than $18,000 per year. It would appear that under
the pay formulas developed in more recent years someone has gained,
through increased productivity, at the expense of the pilot. Far-
sighted airline management in the early 1930's can be credited with
2 Ibid, p. 75.
3Ibid, p. 34.
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the successful conversion of the pilot's pay formula to an hourly basis
from a mileage basis.
The method of mileage payment existed in the airline business
for some time. Even in 1931 when the mail was being flown by private
operators, monthly base pay plus mileage was still the prevailing
method of wage payment.4 However, most companies were no longer
paying twice as much per mile for night flying as compared to day
flying. The terrain differential still appeared in some pay scales. Some
employers, during this period, were even paying their pilots on a
flat monthly salary without regard to mileage flown. In most cases
these were companies that held no mail contracts.
Between 1927 and 1931 airline management recognized the poten-
tialities of the mileage pay formula as it existed under the Post Office,
and through forceful bargaining in a "take-it-or-leave-it" manner
(since there was no organized pilot union at that time) started the
transition from a mileage to an hourly basis. The defeat of mileage
limitation for the airline pilots might well be said to lie in this first
major change in the pay formula-over 20 years ago.
By July, 1933, nine companies, employing 282 pilots, were paying
their pilots by the flight hour, either for actual flying time or for trip
time, that is, the hours which management estimated a trip should
take.5 By the end of 1933, the transition to an hourly basis for paying
pilots had begun to snowball, and a number of the larger companies
had changed from the mile to the flight hour as the primary unit of
wage payment. This resulted in a noticeable increase in flight hours
and an equally noticeable decrease in wages per unit of production,
that is, the mile. Lack of a strong labor union in this period to resist
management's conversion to the new pay formula was again a large
factor in management's success.
Hourly pay varied according to the company, terrain differential,
and type or airplane flown. Base pay varied with length of service.
Mileage was still the basis for wage payment for 185 pilots in the
employ of five companies, all of these being holders of mail contracts.6
The mileage -rates varied from 4 cents for day flying over ordinary
terrain to 10 cents for night flying over hazardous terrain. Each com-
pany paid a base salary in addition to the mileage pay and this ranged
from $12.50 to $250.00 per month, depending upon the company and
length of service of the pilot. Seven companies, employing 21 pilots,
were paying flat monthly salaries at rates which ranged from $100 to
$400 per month.7
In July 1933, the monthly mileage being flown by pilots averaged
slightly less than 10,000, although there were some isolated cases of
4 Pilot's salaries averaged only $569.49 in October, 1931. This was somewhat
less than the average year around income of mail pilots at the end of 1927 of
$600 to $650 per month. See Ibid, pp. 34-35.
5 Ibid, p. 37.6 Ibid, p. 37.
7 Ibid, p. 37.
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pilots flying as high as 17,000 miles per month. In the second six months
of 1933, a period which reflects the results of the large scale introduc-
tion of faster equipment, the average airplane speed on all domestic air-
lines was 116 miles per hour. In the corresponding months of 1932,
the average had been 106 mph. The increase in average speed from
1932 to 1933 was, therefore, nearly 10 percent. In the last six months
of 1934 the average rose to 126 mph, an increase of 8 percent over the
preceding year, and of 19 percent over 1932.8 The effect of the intro-
duction of higher speed equipment becomes evident in the increase
of average miles flown. Even after compensating for the usual seasonal
fluctuations, by the end of 1934, domestic airlines were employing 11
percent fewer pilots than at the end of the previous year as is shown
in the following table.
total miles average passenger
pilots hours flown per speed miles per
employed flown month per hour, pilot
1932, December.. 484 65 6,825 105 14,304
1933, December.. 463 62 7,297 118 22,463
1934, December.. 410 63 8,207 130 38,036
Source: Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Washington,
D. C., 1936.
Further analysis reveals that the higher operating speeds increased
the average number of miles flown per pilot during the periods of
comparison in 1934 by 13.4 percent over the miles flown in 1932, and
at the same time the average number of pilots was 13.5 percent less.
This took place with a 55 percent increase in passenger traffic.9
The five major airlines started their conversion to an hourly system
of pay in March of 1931 and proceeded in the following order: Trans-
continental and Western, American Airways, Western Air Express,
Eastern Air Transport and United Air Lines. The interesting point
to note about these conversions is that all the carriers listed originally
had their own scales for pilot pay. Yet, in October 1933, when United
changed over to an hourly basis of payment, the five companies jointly
announced a new and uniform pay scale for pilots in which the unit
of compensation was based on flight hours in addition to the base
pay. The hourly rates provided for in this pay formula were as follows:
$4.00 per hour for day flying under 125 miles hourly speed
with 20 cents hourly increase to become effective at speeds of 126
miles, 141, 156, 176, and 201 respectively. In addition each pilot
received a base rate of $1,600 per annum, increased by $200 per
annum for each year of service up to a maximum of $3,600 per
year.'0
The rates placed into effect on October 1, 1933 by the "Big-Five"
would not make much difference for the pilot of an airplane flying 100
miles per hour; for here with 10,000 miles per month the operators
scale, based on an hourly rate, was only $40.00 per month below that
8 Ibid, p. 93.
9 Ibid, p. 95.
10 Aviation Week, August 27, 1951, p. 64.
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of the pilots' proposal of mileage pay at the rate of 4 cents for each
day mile and 7 cents for each night mile. However, for an airplane
flying 150 miles per hour, the operators' scale was $173.33 per month
less for 10,000 miles of flying per month, and for planes flying 200 miles
per hour, the operators scale was $240.00 per month less for 10,000
miles than the pay scale which was proposed by the pilots."
There was one small difference in the uniform pay scale proposed
and placed into effect by the operators in 1933. This was a terrain pay
increment for the pilots of United Air Lines. This increment was
later incorporated as a part of Decision 83, and United today is paying
their pilots a terrain pay differential because of their action in Octo-
ber 1933.
BEGINNING OF ALPA
The birth of the Air Line Pilots Association came as a direct result
of the various carriers converting to an hourly basis of pay without
direct negotiation with the pilot group. Even though in existence dur-
ing the conflict, ALPA was new, still weak, and not completely or-
ganized. Despite this situation, the pilots came forth with a counter
proposal to the company wage rates which went into effect October
1, 1933.
The pilots' proposal was based on mileage and was designed to
produce, at operating speeds then current, average earnings compara-
ble with those to be expected from the scale announced by the opera-
tors. Actually the rate was only $.004 per hour more than the operators
had offered for the same number of miles. 12
The pilots did not ask for more money; they just wanted to be paid
on a mileage basis. To arrive at the salary which the operators had
proposed, the pilots requested a base pay of $1,800 per annum in-
creased $200 per annum for each year of service up to a maximum of
$3,000. The mileage pay request was one which would have paid 4
cents per mile day and 7 cents per mile night over flat terrain, and
5 cents per mile day and 9 cents per mile night over hazardous terrain.
Individual flying would have been limited to 80 hours or 10,000 miles
in any one month. This latter figure was increased to 12,000 miles
per month during the Labor Board Proceedings in 1933.1"
Management objected strongly to straight base and mileage pay
for the pilots, fearing it would result in too great a share of the benefits
of faster equipment going to the pilots. Of course the pilots would
have gained, -but the unit cost of production to the airlines was de-
creasing at a faster rate than the pilots were gaining as a result of the
more productive airplanes.
11 Exhibit I, "Report of the Fact Finding Committee and Case of the Air Line
Pilots Association," December 14, 1933, p. 5.
12 Ibid, p.'5.
13 With our present airplanes operating in the vicinity of 300 miles per hour,
this would have limited the pilots today to approximately 40 hours of flying
per month.
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Primarily for the reason that the operator's scale was proposed
simultaneously with the speeding up of plane schedules, a labor dis-
pute developed which threatened to tie up all air transportation. At
this point the National Labor Board was summoned to investigate
the dispute, and the threatened strike was cancelled.
During the proceedings before the National Labor Board, the
pilots contended, that if a limit were not placed on the number of
miles flown in any month, the progressive introduction of high speed
planes would result in decreasing the number of pilots employed. In
principal, at least, doubling the speed of operation cuts in half the
number of pilots required for flying a route, unless, of course, more
schedules are flown. Increasing the speed by 50 percent reduces the
required number of pilots by one-third, and so on in proportion. 4
Management contended that higher speed operation would result in
the employment of more pilots because of increased patronage of the
speedier service. This statement was based primarily on the fact that
United Air Lines had just placed high speed equipment into service
and simultaneously had experienced an increase of passenger traffic
which made it necessary to employ more pilots.' 5
From the safety aspect, it had been agreed that there should be a
limitation of hours to provide for the safety of the passengers, flight
personnel, mail, express, and the airplane itself. The limitation had
been placed to prevent fatigue, and upon this point the discussion was
centered. The main question was whether fatigue was a result of miles
flown or hours flown. There was, and still is, disagreement as to the
effect of increased operating speeds on pilot's fatigue. The Aero
Medical Association has said that fatigue increases with speed. On the
other hand, certain flight surgeons have testified, that in their judg-
ment, fatigue was independent of speed.16 Former President Seymour
of American Airways told the National Recovery Administration that:
"Increased speed of equipment has no bearing on the hours a
commercial pilot should work in a month. There is no sensation of
speed at altitudes where 90 percent of the flying is done; the
medical examiners for the Army and Navy will confirm this state-
ment. Fatigue is in proportion to time and not miles.' 17
The Air Line Pilots Association on the same occasion presented
the view that:
"Increased speeds are invariably attended by increased hazards
and physical strain . . . pilot risk varies directly with the amount
of exposure and the unit of exposure is miles and not hours."' 8
It was agreed that as hazards increased, fatigue also increased.
Therefore the pilots held that the more take-offs and landings made
14 Brief, of the Air Line Pilots Association before the National Labor Board,
December 13, 1933, pp. 16-17.
15 Hours, Wages and Working Conditions in Scheduled Air Transportation,
Washington, D. C., March, 1936, p. 92.
16 Ibid, p. 83.
17 Ibid, p. 83.
18 Ibid, p. 83.
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with faster airplanes, and the greater distance covered meant increased
hazards. For example: a round trip from Washington to Chicago in
an airplane crusing at 150 miles per hour (assume no wind) can be
flown in eight hours. A pilot in the airplane cruising at 300 miles per
hour is able to fly two round trips in eight hours. Thus the pilot in
the faster airplane is subjected to more hazards such as weather (he
may have to fly through a severe frontal activity four times compared
to twice that the pilot of the slower plane would have to fly through
it), traffic congestion, instrument approaches, and the general com-
plexity of the airplane itself. The pilots who fly at 300 mph are cer-
tainly subjected to more hazards, and following in line with statement
previously agreed to, fatigue would then increase.
In November, 1933, the National Labor Board's Fact Finding Com-
mittee, after reviewing a great deal of evidence, expressed the follow-
ing conclusion:
"We know that on water and on land danger increases with
speed beyond a certain point. Whether and to what extent this rule
applies to travel in the air cannot-now be stated with any degree
of certainty. Whether there is increased fatigue or a greater phys-
ical or mental strain caused by higher speed in the air is debatable.
The experience has been too short to warrant any definite expression
of opinion on this point. The subject is one which is worthy of
scientific study. It is clear, however, to a majority of the Com-
mittee, that a substantial increase in speed involves an increased
hazard to airline pilots."19
It was further pointed out that the pilots flying in the early thirties
flew with more regularity and with greater safety than in the preceed-
ing pioneering years. The duties of the pilot, however, had become
more exacting; their performance required greater technical training,
and their burden and personal responsibility had certainly not lessened
as passenger travel expanded and larger planes placed more people in
the pilot's care. Improved aircraft and aids to navigation had made
piloting much safer than formerly, but such aids had not decreased the
pilot's hazards completely because now the pilots were expected to fly
under much more undesirable weather conditions than in the past.
Management expected a much higher percentage of schedules com-
pleted. 20
DIVIDING THE BENEFITS OF BETTER EQUIPMENT
One of the basic points for controversy has always been: "How
shall the benefits gained from more productive equipment be divided?"
In the early days the passengers benefited from the increased produc-
tivity of aircraft and received the lion's share of any gains. For instance,
from 1925 to 1933, passenger rates dropped from 15 cents per mile
to about 6 cents, a figure which is still in existence today, and the mail
19 Ibid, p. 84.
20 Brief, of Air Line Pilots Association to National Recovery Administration,
August, 1933, p. 9.
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subsidy dropped from $1.09 per mile in 1929 to $0.40 per mile in
1933.21 Management has always contended that the principal benefits
of increased airplane productivity rightfully should go to the consumer
in the form of reduced fares, or in the face of rising costs, in the re-
tention of the existing fare structure.
On May 10, 1934 the National Labor Board handed down its im-
portant Decision 83. In this the Board attempted to compromise the
pilots demands for a mileage basis with the operators' scale which
had been uniformly adopted by the "Big-Five" on October 1, 1933, so
that both the company and the pilots would share in the benefits
accruing from the new equipment and bear the burdens that attended
its introduction. 22
What the Board awarded in the mileage issue was a pay structure
for pilots to be paid for all mileage flown at speeds in excess of 100
miles per hour, this being approximately the speed of the airplanes at
that time. The pay scale was as follows:
Under 10,000 miles .......................... 2 cents
10,000 to 11,999 miles ...................... 1 cents
12,000 and over ............. ........... 1 cent
In other words, the more each pilot flew, the less he made per mile,
or per hour, no matter how one computed it, since all other increments
remained constant other than the mileage one. This was, and still is,
exactly opposite to all adopted labor standards which almost universally
require a higher rate for each hour worked in excess of a set number
in a given period. The airline pilots were paid by this decreasing rate
method from 1934 until 1951 when almost half of the airline pilots
in the country succeeded in negotiating a reversal of that principal.
The Board limited the total hours of flying per month to 85, and
further, the Board established minimum rates of pay which could be
paid to airline pilots. Under Decision 83, the rate of base pay was
established at $1,600 per annum with an increase of $200 per annum
for each year of service up to a maximum of $3,000. Hourly rates of
$4.00 for day flying and $6.00 for night flying for speeds under 125
miles per hour, with a 20 cent increase for day flying and a 30 cent
increase for night flying to become effective at hourly speeds of 140,
155, 175, and 200 miles per hour respectively were ordered by the
Board.
On the controversial item of mileage limitation, the National Labor
Board made the following statement:
"Experience has not crystallized sufficiently to put a maximum
on the monthly mileage of air pilots. ''23
The Board pointed out that if by scientific determination, a direct
limitation of mileage should ever be found to be necessary, the power
to prescribe such a limitation should be definitely conferred by statute
21 Ibid, p.7.
22 Decision 83, National Labor Board, Washington, D. C., May 10, 1934.
28 Ibid.
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upon the appropriate administrative agency, but if mileage limitation
were desirable purely for regularizing employment, it should be ac-
complished, as in railroad service, by agreement between the employees
and the airlines. 24 Thus the pilots lost their first battle in an effort to
obtain, mileage limitation.
Following the National Labor Board's Decision 83, the United
States Congress, in establishing the Air Mail Act of 1934, required that
each carrier awarded a mail contract comply with Decision 83. The
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 in Section 401-L-1 stated that:
"Every air carrier shall maintain rates of compensation, maxi-
mum hours, and other working conditions and relations of all its
pilots and copilots who are engaged in interstate air transportation
within the continental United States (not including Alaska) so as
to conform with Decision numbered 83 made by the National
Labor Board on May 10, 1934, notwithstanding any limitation
therein as to the period of its effectiveness. '25
Section 401-L-3 of the 1938 Act further stated that:
"Nothing herein contained shall be construed as restricting the
right of any such pilots or copilots, or other employees, of any such
carrier to obtain by collective bargaining higher rates of compensa-
tion or more favorable working conditions or relations."
This latter section of the Act has been considered an indication
that Congress realized that there were other factors in the offing that
would have to be taken into consideration. It should be borne in
mind that when the early negotiations were going on between manage-
ment and the pilots there was no law in existence which guaranteed
the collective bargaining rights of air line pilots and copilots. To
remedy this, Title II of the Railway Labor Act was signed in 1936 by
President Franklin Roosevelt bringing this group of employees under
the provision of the Railway Labor Act.26
Generally, the carriers complied with Decision 83, and although the
pilots were not completely convinced that .they were receiving a fair
share of the increased productivity of the DC-3 over its predecessor
planes, they did not advance any strong contract proposals to modify
the original decision until 1941.
The T.W.A. Situation
At this time, the first new equipment was being introduced on
T.W.A. in the form of the Boeing Stratoliner. Not only was the Strato-
liner a faster airplane than the DC-3, but it was also considerably
heavier. The first version of the Stratoliner weighed 45,000 pounds,
compared to slightly over 25,000 for the DC-3. Management contended
24 Hours, Wages, and Working Conditions in Scheduled Air Transportation,
p. 118.25 Section 5 of Decision 83 originally ordered that the award remain in effect
for a period of one year.
20 "Report of the Emergency Board and Transcript of Proceedings to In-
vestigate a Dispute Between the Air Line Pilots Association and TWA et al,"
National Mediation Board, New York, New York, 1946, Vol. 4, p. 391.
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that the pay scale established in Decision 83 provided sufficient increase
for the pilots because of the increased productivity involved. The
pilot thinking was that they were not receiving a fair increase for
flying the larger faster ship. Collective bargaining and mediation as
specified under Title II of the Railway Labor Act failed to produce
a settlement, and in one of the few cases where management has ac-
cepted arbitration, an award was made on June 23, 1941 which recog-
nized the increased productivity of the pilots. This award gave the
pilot $6.50 per flight hour for day flying and $9.60 per hour for night
flying. These amounts were further increased in a second arbitration
award dated March 26, 1945 which resulted from the introduction of
a newer model of the Boeing Stratoliner weighing 54,000 pounds.
With the introduction of the Douglas Skymaster DC-4 and the
Lockheed Constellation in the mid-forties, the problem again arose
as to what portion of the increased productivity should go to the pilots.
The issue at that time was rapidly becoming industry-wide since there
were thirteen airlines involved in the four-engine equipment program.
Management of the thirteen airlines in question were aware of the fact
that there was going to be a strenuous effort on the part of the various
pilot groups to increase their salaries, and in an attempt to strengthen
their position, formed an "Airlines Negotiating Committee." 27 The
Air Line Pilots Association objected violently to this procedure, but
the CAB declared it legal under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.28
Collective bargaining and mediation between the TWA pilots
and their management, as represented by the Airlines Negotiating
Committee, failed to resolve the basic issues, and as a result the Na-
tional Mediation Board proffered arbitration. This was tentatively ac-
cepted by management, but it was conditional, predicated on the fact
that the award would be applied to the pilots of all thirteen carriers
involved. ALPA insisted that the award would apply only to the TWA
pilots, and as a result the dispute was not arbitrated. Following this,
a strike vote was taken on TWA, and the result was 812 for and 9
against the strike.29
The Mediation Board notified the President of the United States
of the proposed strike advising the President that "in their judgment
the strike would interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to
deprive a section of the country of essential transportation." The Presi-
dent then, by virtue of the authority vested in him in Section 10 of
the Railway Labor Act, created an Emergency Fact-Finding Board to
investigate the dispute and make recommendations for its settlement.
In the presentation of their case to the Board, the pilots first pointed
out that they had received no increases in their rates of compensation
since Decision 83. It was further stated that in 1934 the country was
27 This committee was composed of representatives from the thirteen airlines
involved, and was an attempt on the part of the carriers to conduct negotiations
on an industry-wide basis.
28 "Report to the President by Emergency Boards," June 20, 1946-June 30,
1949, Vol. 2, p. 8.
29 Ibid, p. 8.
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just beginning to recover from its worst depression, and salaries of that
time were no longer sufficient to meet increased living costs.
The representatives of management admitted that its pilots were
entitled to a reasonable share of any increase in productivity which
resulted from the operation of larger and faster aircraft, but they
argued that such reasonable increases in earnings were already possible
under the hourly and mileage increments as established in Decision 83
and embodied in the then current working agreement.30 As for the
cost of living increase, the carrier contended that Decision 83 also
automatically met the situation as demonstrated by the increased take
home pay over the years. The DC-3 pilot flying 85 hours under Decision
83 had a take home pay of $789.75 while the Constellation pilot flying
the same number of hours received $904.50. 81
The original intent when Decision 83 was established was that the
increased pay from flying the more productive airplanes would not
merely offset the increased cost of living but would be an additional
amount for flying the larger and faster equipment. The members of
the original board apparently assumed that the formula of Decision 83
would be workable only in a static economy, for they specifically out-
lined that higher rates of pay could be negotiated. This principal was
reaffirmed by Congress in the Act of 1938 as mentioned previously.
With the Constellation flying twice as fast as the DC-3 and carrying
up to three times as many passengers, the pilots argued that the pay
differential arrived at by the application of the Decision 83 formula
was not sufficient. 32 pointing out that the Constellation domestic pilot
pay for a four year captain was $2.07 per ton mile at 65 percent payload,
and the DC-3 pilot cost was $5.25 per ton mile at 65 percent payload. 83
This meant a $3.18 saving per ton mile to the company.
As a result of these facts and statistics, the TWA pilots asked for
the following changes in their pay formula. Their hourly pay, referring
back to Decision 83, should be set at a rate of $5.00 for day flying and
$7.50 for night flying at speeds of 200 mph or more. The pilots asked
that the speed brackets be extended in 40 mph brackets with an in-
crease of $0.40 for day flying and $0.60 for night flying for each bracket.
This would produce a day hourly rate of $6.40 and a night hourly
rate of $9.60 for the bracket of 320 mph and over. They requested a
maximum of 80 hours per month with an 85 hour maximum in any
one month if necessary for the DC-4 pilots. For the Constellation pilots
the pilot group asked that a 75 hour per month limitation be placed
with a maximum of 85 hours in any one month if necessary to complete
the schedules.
80 Ibid, p. 27.
a' Ibid, p. 27.
82 The plane's productivity was increased 500 percent, yet the pilot's wages
were to be increased from $789.75 to only $904.50 for flying the Constellations
instead of the DC-3.
83 "Report of the Emergency Board and Transcript of Proceedings to In-
vestigate a Dispute Between the Air Line Pilots Association and TWA et al,"
National Mediation Board, New York, New York, 1946, Vol. 10, p. 1245.
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The pilots further asked that their base pay for DC-4 pilots be
increased from $133.33 per month in the first year to $300.00 with in-
creases of $25.00 per month each year until a top of $475.00 per month
was reached. The top base pay established under Decision 83 and at
that time still applicable was $250.00 per month. For Constellation
pilots, the pilot group requested a starting base pay of $325.00 and
$25.00 increases up to $500.00 per month. This, incidentally, marked
the first time that a different base pay had been requested for each
type of equipment flown.
For mileage pay on the DC-4, the pilots asked that the mileage pay
established in Decision 83 be amended to read 4 cents for each mile
under 10,000, 3 cents for the next 2,000, and 2 cents for all remaining
miles, these to be computed for all miles flown in excess of 100 mph.
The pilots also asked that there be a limit of 22,000 miles per month
for all DC-4 pilots.
The mileage pay on Constellations was proposed at 5, 4, and 3
cents, to be computed on the same basis as that for the DC-4 pilots.
There was proposed a maximum of 24,000 miles per month for all
Constellation pilots.
In their presentation before the Board, the pilots presented the
following arguments :84
1. The equipment in question was heavier, faster, larger, and
more productive from a revenue standpoint, and they were en-
titled to share in such increased productivity.
2. Its operation involved more responsibility and hence re-
quired a "higher and more exacting degree of qualification, skill,
and technique."
3. The result of such operation would be the reduction in num-
ber of pilots, and copilots required "for a given job of flying."
4. The 1941 and 1945 Boeing arbitration awards recognized
that pilots should receive higher compensation for flying heavier,
faster, and more productive equipment.
5. Pilots may obtain better salaries than outlined in Decision
83 as specified by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.
6. The pilots had had no increase since 1934, other than some
minor "fringe" benefits.
7. TWA management decided that more time was needed by
pilots in checking weather, routes, and figurifig a flight plan due
to much greater distances involv ed; therefore more weather and
other variables Wvould be encountered, and so management of TWA
required their pilots to report for duty one and one-half hours
before departure instead of one as had been accepted practice for
years.
8. The railroads historically followed the principle: "The greater
the weight, the greater the salary."
9. The rigidity of physical and mental requirements made it
certain that a large number of pilots would be grounded before
reaching the age of fifty.
84 See "Report to the President by Emergency Boards," June 20, 1946-June 30,
1949, Vol. 2, p. 26.
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Management again replied that Decision 83 more than compensated
the pilots for the claims outlined in numbers 1, 2, and 6 above. They
further argued that the faster planes produced more employment, not
less as claimed by the pilots. The company said that the pay demands
were "astronomical" and "absurd," being "fantastic" and on "no
possible basis" could they be justified. Increased and improved naviga-
tional aids took the greater part of risk out of flying, and so the hazard
angle could no longer be used as a justification for higher salaries
argued the company. The copilot, who formerly had to handle the
baggage, serve meals and act as a passenger attendant, no longer had
to perform these duties and was available full time to help the pilot
in any manner prescribed by the captain, thus reducing the work load
of the pilot. It was also pointed out that the airplanes of 1946 were
much better sound-proofed than the earlier planes, and this sub-
stantially reduced the fatigue brought on by excessive noise. General
improvements in the later airplanes, such as propeller de-icers, auto-
matic mixture controls, carburetor heaters, and many- others supposedly
made the pilots' job safer and easier. The company finally stated that
such increases would possibly require a request for higher mail pay
and the pilots' pay demands might not be included as an "allowable
cost."
When the Board handed down its recommendations, it did not
conform to the pilots demands that they have a separate schedule for
each plane for mileage and base pay purposes. 35 It was pointed out
that the pilots had not made that request when the Ford Tri-Motor
was replaced by the DC-3.
The Board stated that the increased rates and new schedule for
each type of plane for domestic and international service would yield
earnings far in excess of the pilots' work and responsibilities on the
new planes, and would also change the fundamental purpose of the
formula as originally established in 1934 in ways that were not justified
either by the record or the experience of twelve years under the
original formula.36
The Board did recommend, however, that the mileage increment
as established by Decision 83 be amended since it did not adequately
compensate for the higher speeds. The Board recommended that a
rate of 11/2 cents per mile be substituted for the 1 cent mileage rate
for monthly mileages of 12,000 and over flown at speeds in excess of
100 mph.
For hourly rates the Board recommended that the brackets be ex-
tended in 25 mph increments starting with 200 mph and extending
through 300 mph. In the bracket 200-225 mph, the day rate was to
be $5.00 per hour and the night rate was. to be $7.50 per hour. 20
cents was to be added to each bracket for day flying and 30 cents to
35 Ibid, p. 29.
36 Ibid, p. 29.
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each bracket for night flying. This would yield $5.60 per day flight
hour and $8.40 per night flight hour in the 275-300 mph bracket.8 7
The Railway Labor Act specifies that the recommendations of any
Fact-finding Board are not binding, and since the pilot group did not
consider the recommendations adequate they prepared for a strike
which followed shortly thereafter.
On November 15, 1946, the TWA pilot group and their manage-
ment signed an arbitration agreement and this action terminated the
strike. (The results of this arbitration award were to be binding only
upon the TWA pilots and not all the pilots of the thirteen airlines
represented on the "Airlines Negotiating Committee.") The Com-
mittee had always argued that any awards would be applicable to all
thirteen airlines but ALPA argued against this.
On January 22, 1947 an arbitration award was handed down in
which the following decisions were included.
1. Pilots flying DC-4 and Constellation type equipment received
a $50.00 per month increase in base pay.
2. The hourly pay rates recommended by the Presidential Fact-
finding Board were ordered placed into effect.
3. The mileage pay section was amended to read as follows:
"The number of miles to be paid for at 2 cents shall equal 10,000
minus the hours flown in the month times 100; the remaining miles
to be paid for at 1Y2 cents.
Example: Assuming 80 hours flying time at 205 mph:
Miles flown in month (80 x 205) .............. 16,400
Less miles at hourly speeds of 100 mph
(hours flown in month times 100 or 80 x 100) . 8,000
Miles to be paid for .................... 8,400
2000 miles at 2 cents
10,000 - (80 x 205) ...................... $ 40.00
6400 miles at 1.5 cents
(8400 - 2000) ........................... 96.00
Total mileage pay for month ........... $136.00
Source: Arbitration Award, Under the Railway Labor Act 45
U. S. C. 151, 157, et seq., Air Line Pilots Association and Trans-
continental and Western Air, Inc., January 22, 1947.
There was no provision included in the Presidential Fact-Finding
Board's recommendations for any mileage limitation and this debatable
question was not included in the items to be decided upon by the
arbitration board. Thus the pilots might be said to have lost the sec-
ond round in their efforts to obtain some sort of mileage limitation.
Following the TWA arbitration award negotiations were resumed
on other airlines and settlements were accomplished throughout the
industry. These settlements included the improvements established by
the decision of the arbitration award and in addition the base pay
increase on many lines was extended to include all first pilots on all
types of equipment. Also, a gross weight pay figure appeared in the
87 Ibid, p. 42.
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pilot's pay formula for the first time. This paid the pilot 1 3/4 cents for
each 1,000 pounds certificated gross take-off weight each hour of flight
time. This was probably the most notable gain for the pilots in their
efforts to receive a bigger share of the gains derived from the larger,
faster, and heavier airplanes.
American Airlines Case
Shortly after the airline industry had settled their "four-engine"
disputes with the pilots a situation was being developed on American
Airlines which later led to the mightiest of all efforts on the part of
the pilots to obtain a mileage limitation. Immediately following the
war the pilots on American Airlines, as on all other airlines, were
looking forward to the rapid expansion which was about to take place
in the field of air transportation. To them it meant probable promo-
tion to Captain, improved working conditions, and increased job
security. The number of pilots working for American Airlines had
steadily increased until it reached a peak of 1,291 in 1946.81
At this point the first post war equipment began appearing on
American Airlines, and its effect on the number of pilots required can
best be illustrated by the following table.
TOTAL PILOTS
ON PAYROLL8 9  REMARKS
50 passenger 240 mph DC-4
1946 March .......... 1,291 introduced.
52 passenger 300 mph DC-6
1947 March .......... 1,055 introduced in April.
40 passenger 286 mph Convair
1948 March .......... 828 introduced in June.
Transition to new equipment
complete. 21 passenger 180
mph DC-3 removed from ached-
1949 March .......... 740 ule.
Total Decrease ..... 551
This reduction in the number of pilots was equal to 43 percent.
The question then arose as to (1) whether the reduction in pilots was
due to the new equipment, (2) to a reduction in business, or (3) was
the pilot list inflated in 1946? The following table will clearly indicate
that there was not a reduction of business in this period.
Revenue Seat Available
For twelve month passenger miles miles ton miles
period ending (in millions) (in millions) (in millions)
December 1946 ........ 1,307.9 1,603.2 224.4
December 1947 ........ 1,379.3 1,967.4 259.6
December 1948 ........ 1,303.1 2,149.5 302.7
December 1949 ........ 1,504.8 2,323.9 322.6
Source: CAB Domestic Rates Section.
38 From W. W. Braznell, Director of Flight, American Airlines.
39 Statistics from W. W. Braznell, Director of Flight, American Airlines.
Chart computed by ALPA and filed as a Brief before the American Airlines Fact-
finding Board of 1951.
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In reply to the question as to whether or not the pilot list was
inflated in 1946, the pilots produced the pilot utilization figures for
the pilot group for the period. The results are as follows:
Hours
December 1946 ............................... 77:00
December 1947 ............................... 81:54
December 1948 ............................... 81:42
January 1949 ................................. 82:18
Source: W. W. Braznell, Director of Flight, American Airlines.
It can clearly be seen that the utilization increased only slightly
over five percent during this period, which would indicate that the
airline did not have an excess of pilots during the time.
The trend was, of course, as shown by the above tables, that fewer
and fewer pilots were being required, and each remaining pilot through
the use of the faster equipment was producing more and more, and in
return was receiving only a slight increase in pay. In December, 1946,
for example, 1177 pilots were flying 1,307.9 million revenue pas-
senger miles. By December of 1949, only 772 pilots were flying 1,504.8
million passenger miles. This required. that pilots fly more trips, and be
on duty more days than they had ever been in the past. Longer lay-
overs were required and generally each pilot was required to be on
duty many more hours than previously to complete his 85 hour flight
time limitation.
The lesser number of pilots forced many men who had been flying
first pilot for many years to return to copilot status with a resultant
large decrease in earnings. The situation reached the point where, by
1950, the most junior copilot on American Airlines had been with
the company 5-5/6 years, and the most senior copilot or junior captain
had been with the company 8 full years.40
Primarily because of the statistical data presented above, the pilots
felt that they were being unjustly penalized as a result of the intro-
duction of the new equipment, and that they were not fairly sharing
from the increased productivity of the post war airplanes. They also
recognized that management must also share in the rewards, of the
faster, heavier equipment. The pilots felt that they could safely fly
more than the 13,600 miles per month they had been flying in the
DC-3's, but they insisted that the number of increased miles flownin
the faster equipment should be controlled and further, that it must
not unjustly penalize the pilots.
Decision 83 of the National Labor Board, showed some recognition
of the fact that changes would be required at some time in the future.
But apparently the Board did not realize the adverse effect that the
post war aircraft would have on general pilot working conditions. It
will be recalled that Decision 83 stated that, "it would be advisable
to adopt a basis of pay under which both the company and the employee
would share in the benefits accruing from the new equipment and bear
40 American Airlines Seniority Lists, 1939-1950.
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the burden that attended its introduction in the beginning." It was
with this in mind that the pilot's proposal was designed as one of
"mileage increase determination," hereafter referred to as MID.
This was a proposal which would enable not only the carrier to
continue its program of reducing flight crew cost per unit produced,
but would also aid the pilot group in maintaining minimum pilot
standards of working conditions, health, and efficiency, despite vastly
increased productivity and the usual deterioration of working condi-
tions as the result of the introduction of faster equipment into
schedule. 41
The pilots established two constant factors to form a basis for the
proposal. The first of these was the maximum of 85 hours already
federal law, and the second constant was obtained by multiplying the
speed of the DC-3 (160 mph) by the 85 hour figure. The resulting
figure was 13,600 miles and this was used as a base figure for all future
mileage computations. The DC-3 was used because it had been in
use since 1936, and pilot standards of job content became more or
less standardized around the trip frequency, miles flown, trip distances,
and other related pilot workihg conditions that were peculiar to the
utilization of aircraft. 42 It was further pointed out that most all of
the rules sections of the pilots' working agreements in effect in 1951
were written on the basis of the utilization of the DC-3 type aircraft.
The pilots then established certain steps to be followed in the
application of the Mileage Increase Determination formula. These
are listed below:
1. Determination of the base mileage.
DC-3-85 hours of flying at 160 mph
160 x 85 = 13,600 miles per month.
2. Determination of the increased miles per hour that would be
flown by the faster aircraft.
Assume a DC-6 at 250 mph
Subtract 160 mph (DC-3 speed)
90 mph increase in speed
3. Determine the amount of the increased miles which should
accrue to the airline and the amount which should be applied to
maintain pilot standards.
90 mph divided by 2 = 45 miles per hour to each party.
4. Determine the number of increased miles to be flown per month
by a pilot in a specific aircraft.
Increased miles per hour= 45
x 85 hours
3,825 increased miles per month
41 Brief, by Air Line Pilots Association in the Presidential Fact-finding
Board proceedings, 1951.42 Brief, "Background, Application, and Explanation of the American Air-
lines Pilot's Mileage Increase Determination Proposal" filed by the Air Line Pilots
Association in the Presidential Fact-finding Board Proceedings, 1951, p. 2.
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5. Determine the miles per month to be flown by a pilot in a
specific aircraft.
Base mileage per month 13,600
Increased mileage per month 3,825
Pilots' monthly mileage for DC-6 type aircraft 17,425
6. This can then be expressed in an hourly figure for scheduling
purposes.
17,425 divided by 250 mph (DC-6 speed) = 69.6 hours
Source: Brief, by the Air Line Pilots Association, "Steps in Apply-
ing Mileage Increase Determination." 1951, p. 6.
It may be asked why the pilots did not request a straight mileage
limitation similar to the railroads where an engineer is permitted
only a fixed number of miles per month. Actually, this was considered
quite seriously by the pilots at one time, especially when they discov-
ered early in their research program that the miles flown in a month
had increased at an average rate of about 600 miles per month for the
past twenty years. 48 There is actually some justification for a fixed
limit on the number of miles which a pilot could fly during a month
even though this would restrict a pilot's future earnings. Even with a
fixed limit on miles a pilot's total productivity could remain the same
as it had been in the past since speed and miles flown are not the only
measure of productivity of an aircraft in as much as the size and weight
could increase to the point where the pilot's salary per ton mile could
continually be reduced as larger and faster planes were put into service.
It must be recalled that the basic unit around which the transporta-
tion industry revolves is the mile. All cost elements of any transporta-
tion enterprise are quoted in terms of miles; deaths from accidents
in air transportation are computed on a passenger mile basis; air mail
payments are based on a ton mile; why not pilot's pay?
The American Airlines pilots conceded that they could safely fly
in excess of 13,600 miles per month and still maintain their basic
standards of working conditions, health, and efficiency. Management
contended that a full 85 hours should be flown regardless of the number
of miles which would result.
Without some correction tO their basic contract, any reduction in
number of hours worked would also bring about a reduction in pay.
The pilots wanted to maintain their present salary and work less
hours per month. The pilots' proposal, therefore, contained an ad-
justment in the pilots' gross weight compensation in order to counter-
act the reductions in hourly and mileage pay after the MID went into
effect."
Application of the MID formula would have resulted in the
43Brief, "A comparison of the Pilot's Mileage 'Increase Determination Pro-
posal and a Flat or Fixed Mileage Limitation, ALPA, 1951, p. 8.
44 Reducing hours without reducing take home pay was not new, for effective
November 1, 1950, pilots on Pan-American received $75.00 per month more pay
for 10 less flying hours per month. Also, American Airlines had reduced the work
week from 48 to 40 hours in 1946 with no loss of pay to over 9,000 employees.
This reduction applied to all employees except flight personnel.
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American Airlines pilots flying a 1,000 mph jet aircraft 51,000 miles
per month or 51 hours. For this he would have received $2,546 per
month. Under the old contract he would have been paid $2,815 per
month so the pilots were actually negotiating for a pay cut when the
formula was applied to the planes of the future.
The management of the various airlines confronted with the MID
proposal said that it was just another method of "featherbedding."
This was the wrong term to apply because it is not featherbedding
when an individual is being paid only for work performed. Actually
the pilot groups do not want to "featherbed." For instance, a pilot on
a major airline flying DC-3's used to fly 7 round trips a month between
Washington and Chicago. With the introduction of DC-6's and Con-
stellations, the pilot is required to fly 15 trips. Under the MID formula,
that pilot wanted to split the difference and fly 11, and furthermore
he only wanted to be paid for 11 trips. It is true that an individual
could make more money on 15 trips, however, he would then have to
make more take-offs, more landings, more approaches 4 5 and encounter
more fatigue producing factors which takes us again to the safety
aspect of an excessive number of miles flown.
We all know that as speed increases, visibility decreases and hazards
and nervous strain increase. All in all faster equipment means a shorten-
ing of active flying life. No one knows exactly what effect continued
high altitude flying, even in pressurized cabins, will have on the
human body. A pilot does not enjoy the job security in this respect
that any other professional man or laborer does. For this reason, would
it not be a fitting and proper requirement that management pay the
pilot a high salary while he is capable?
In reply to the pilots' proposals, management recognized the in-
creased productivity, but argued that they had received little or no
benefit themselves from the introduction of the newer equipment.
This argument was based on the following:
The productivity of each of American's employees increased
$3,529 during the years 1940-1949. Of this amount $1,492 went to
the public in the form of retention or reduction of rates, $1,947 to
increased wages and benefits of its employees, and only $72.00 or
2 percent to the company and its stockholders in dividends or net
profits.46
The Fact-finding Board, in their analysis, mentioned that the pilots
were basing their case heavily on the decline in the number of pilots
employed by American Airlines since 1946. Contrary to the pilots'
viewpoint, the Board considered that the company had an abnormally
high number of pilots on the payroll in 1946, brought about by several
circumstances. One of these was that the company's military transport
45 Aviation Week, August 27, 1951, p. 65 stated that a pilot on the New York-
Washington route with stops at Philadelphia and Baltimore has been known to
make 13 instrument approaches in one day.
46 Dobben, Gerard B., "AA-ALPA Hearings Resumed on Mileage Limitation
Issue," American Aviation, February 19, 1952.
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contract was terminated suddenly, thus making available a large group
of pilots, and in addition a large number of veterans had just returned
from the armed services. 47 The company was also involved in a very
extensive training program training all of its pilots for the new equip-
ment which was to be delivered shortly thereafter. This, of course,
required that for each pilot in training, there be an additional pilot
required to fly his trips back on the line. The Board further pointed
out that the utilization in 1946 was only 59 hours per month, or 20
percent below that in 1950.48
The Board further stated that since the total number of pilots in
the air transportation industry had grown from 308 in 1928 to 6,831
in 1950, the number of pilots employed would continue to be increased.
This may have been an error on the Board's part as they apparently
felt that the air transportation industry would continue to expand in
the future at the same rate as it had in the past twenty years. The
increased number of pilots required each year during the first twenty
years of the industry's existence will probably not be duplicated. Route
mileages will be increased only slightly, if at all. Consequently the
only increase in pilots required will be through the addition of sched-
ules as business requires.
The Board stated that the benefits of increased productivity need
not necessarily go to labor as evidenced by the views of the Steel In-
dustry Board of 1949 which had been established to resolve the differ-
ences between management and labor over wage improvements result-
ing from the exceptional rise in productivity in the steel industry. That
Board said in its summary:
"It is the belief of the Board . . .wage rates in a particular
industry should not be tied directly to productivity in that in-
dustry, but rather should be related to the general industrial rise
in productivity, and that any excess of productivity in any one
industry over the general average should provide primarily the
means of reducing the prices, of the products of that industry."49
With reference to the safety aspect of flying the additional mileage
per month, the Board referred to the judgment of the professional risk
calculators who make up life insurance rates. It was noted that many
occupations, mainly on the railroads, required the payment of higher
extra insurance premiums than did the occupation of airline pilot.50
The mortality rate of pilots had dropped from a high of 87 per 1,000
in 1929 to 1.1 per 1,000 in 1950. It is true that the actual mortality rate
as attributed directly to flying was considerably less, however, due to
the short time that' the industry has been in existence, there has been
47 "The Report to the President by the Emergency Board," Washington, D. C.,
May 25, 1951, No. 94, p. 18.
4s Ibid, p. 19. This figure does not agree with the utilization figures furnished
by the company and referred to earlier in this report. The Board obviously com-
puted utilization in a different manner than the company or the pilots.
49 "Report to the President by the Steel Industry Board," September 10, 1949,
p. 3. See also, p. 44.
50 Supra, note 51, p. 31.
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no detailed study and analysis made relating to the possible premature
deaths attributed indirectly to flying. It is most important that a study
of this sort be made before factual statistics can be presented.
In so far as mileage increase determination was concerned, the
Board stated that it was without precedent either in this country or in
any other country, and furthermore, the present limitation of 85 hours
a month was below the limits set in many other countries. 51
The pilots on American Airlines were advised by the Board to not
worry about the effect of high speed jet and turbo-prop engines for
some time since it was quite probable that there would be no deliveries
of that type of equipment on U.S. domestic lines before 1956 or 1957.
Furthermore, American's fleet had just recently been modernized, and
there would certainly be no more technological layoffs for some time
since management could be expected to get some use out of their big
investment in post war aircraft. Planes would not get much heavier
for some time since there were few airports in the country which could
handle planes much heavier than present day equipment.
What was probably the determining factor in the Board's decision
was the final point made before issuing its recommendations. This
point was:
"On March 13, 1951, the Department of Labor added airline
pilots to the list of critically short employees. In such circumstances
it is inappropriate to recommend a reduction in the work hours
of American workers, particularly of those in a craft which has
been declared to be suffering from a critical shortage. ' 52
Referring back to the original MID proposal, one sees that it did
call for a reduced number of hours to be worked by each pilot per
month. This was undoubtedly the greatest determining factor in the
Board's decision of mileage limitation which was as follows:
"It is therefore the suggestion of the Board, that if and when
American Airlines places an order for planes with a speed of 325
mph or more, the parties promptly undertake a joint study to ascer-
tain the effect of such equipment on work load and job content, with
a view to agreeing upon the facts and reaching a conclusion as to
what, if anything, should be done thereupon, with respect to the
workload or the monthly flying hours."53
The Board then formally recommended that the request for "mile-
age increase determination" be withdrawn. Members of the Board
admitted that a much more constructive decision could have been ar-
rived at through collective bargaining action between the parties who
knew the industry than through a board composed of laymen whose
sole contact with the problem was through verbal testimony.
The pilots were disturbed at their failure to secure the recom-
mendations of the Board for a MID. Unrest was apparent in all pilot
groups throughout the country. Strikes were imminent, for under the
51 Ibid, p. 32.
52 Ibid, p. 43.
53 Ibid, pp. 44-45.
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Railway Labor Act, recommendations of a Fact-finding Board are not
binding and may be rejected by either party. American Airlines man-
agement reluctantly accepted the recommendations although they
stated that they did not agree with all sections.
Several concrete recommendations did come out of the proceedings,
however. Among these were full paid vacations, pay guarantees and
probably the most important was recognition of the fact that the copilot,
the "forgotten man" of the industry in the past, should be paid on a
scale more nearly equal to that of the first pilot. The Board recom-
mended that the copilot be paid his full copilot base pay, and in addi-
tion, 55 percent of the first pilot's flight pay. This was the first time
in the history of the pilot's pay scale that the copilot had been recom-
mended for the various increments of hourly, weight, and mileage pay
which had been paid to the first pilot for years.
Why did the pilots not receive more favorable recommendations
from the Board? It has been stated that there was so much confusion
and misunderstanding in the preparation of the case that some ALPA
representatives did not thoroughly understand the problem and pro-
posals themselves. No one will ever know what the decision would
have been had the case been handled differently, or if a change in
tactics had been employed after the proceedings had commenced.
The pilots were undergoing severe internal difficulties in their own
association at the critical time when strategy was being developed for
the mileage limitation fight, thus weakening their front. Originally
it had been scheduled to be an "all-out fight." In addition, the threat
of government seizure of the industry hung over the heads of the
pilot group. This could have tied up settlement for many months as
it had in the case of the railroads. Labor would have been denied con-
siderable in financial gains indefinitely.
After consideration of all the factors following the recommenda-
tions of the Board, the Executive Board of ALPA advised each pilot
group involved that they were released from the MID Mandate issued
by the 11th Convention of ALPA in 1950, and further advised each
pilot group to settle on the best terms which they could secure.
There began, to say the least, a very critical period for the airline
pilots of America. Not only had their association not received the
favorable recommendations of the Fact-finding Board, in so far as
mileage limitation was concerned, but the Association was on the verge
of falling apart because of internal difficulties over the contested re-
moval of their president, D. L. Behncke.
ALPA, through the leadership of Clarence N. Sayen (now President
of ALPA), reorganized themselves and carefully analyzed the various
pilot employment contracts in existence at that time. Each time they
came up with the conclusion that perhaps the MID formula would not
have been the best solution to the problem. ALPA leaders further
agreed that if they could arrive at some new formula of pay computa-
tion where the overall rate would increase as the total number of hours
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(or miles) increased rather than decreased, the group could begin from
that point and expand their contracts as conditions required. To il-
lustrate the above, a pilot had been paid a base pay of $300 per month
regardless of hours flown. If he flew one hour he received $300, or if
he flew 85 hours he received the same amount. This, of course,
prompted the employer to acquire maximum utilization of 85 hours
out of each pilot. In other words, each hour a pilot flew, he actually
reduced his overall hourly rate as it applied to his total monthly pay.
This was true even though the hourly and weight pay remained con-
stant for each hour flown regardless of the number of hours flown.
Mileage pay, however, was such that the first 100 mph were flown free,
and all speeds in excess of 100 mph were compensated for at an ever
decreasing rate. ALPA leaders then decided that this mileage section
was in definite need of amendment, and proposed that it be amended
in two ways: (1) to have pilots paid for all miles flown, and (2) to
have the pilots paid for mileage flown at an increasing rate for miles
flown, rather than at a decreasing rate such as that which had been
in existence since Decision 83. This would, in effect, allow the com-
panies to utilize their pilots up to 85 hours as in the past, however, the
companies would have to pay an increased rate for all miles flown in
excess of a certain number. This would establish a contract principle
similar to all wage patterns in existence in industry today which do
not limit hours, but merely require the employer to pay a higher rate
if he chooses to work an employee beyond a certain point. (This rate
in industry is generally time and one-half for all work in excess of a
set number of hours, increasing to double time after exceeding another
higher established number of hours.)
Increasing the base pay section would have had no effect on in-
creasing the overall hourly rate as hours or miles flown increased, in
fact, it would have had exactly the opposite effect. For this reason full
attention focused on the mileage pay section.
Eastern Airlines, which historically has had an outstanding pilot-
management relationship, recognized the pilots' problem and agreed
to negotiate along the lines mentioned above, despite strong opposition
from the management of other carriers. A formula was arrived at,
since known as the Eastern formula, which provided for a rate of one
cent per mile for all miles flown from zero to 17,000 per month; two
cents for all miles flown from 17,000 to 22,000 per month; and three
cents for all miles flown in excess of 22,000 in any one month. When
applied to the Constellation type aircraft with a speed of 250 mph, the
pilots will start receiving the two cent rate at approximately the 68
hour point in their monthly schedule. In a normal month the Con-
stellation pilot will not exceed 22,000 miles so will not receive any
"three cent miles."
The copilots won a major victory at this point too, for they, for
the first time were placed on an hourly, mileage, and weight pay
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
formula equal to approximately 50 percent of the first pilots' flight
pay.5 4
The TWA pilots and their management negotiated along different
lines and as a result of these negotiations, the TWA formula was born.
This called for the pilots to be paid at a straight 11/2 cents for all
miles flown.
The Eastern and TWA formulas provided the basis for the settle-
ment of almost all pilot employment contracts in the U.S. since 1951.
With the recently completed Pan-American contract, the. Eastern
formula provides the basis for pay computation for over half of the
pilots as represented by the Air Line Pilots Association. Individual
airline equipment problems may require certain variations to either
of the above formulas, and in the future these problems will be
handled as they arise.
Although the Eastern formula is definitely not a mileage limitation
it is a very logical step in the right direction to the solution of one of
the problems which has confronted the airline pilots since the birth
of their profession, for now management will no longer have the same
profit incentive for full 85 hour utilization of its pilots.
54 The Fact-finding Board had recommended 55 percent, but this figure was
based upon the condition that the first pilots' pay was not to be increased. With
the increase of the first pilots, the net amount in dollars and cents was almost
equal to what the Board recommended.
